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Abstract
This Article offers a general examination and analysis of Russian labor law, including its
historic origin and current status, and it also examines the existing enforcement mechanisms for
its provisions. It also provides a comparison of Russian labor law and enforcement to the labor
regulations and enforcement in four other countries: the United States of America, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Mexico. The Article concludes that Russia’s failure to comply with
and enforce its labor regulations is deeply rooted in the culture’s historic distrust and disrespect
for the law that was typical during Soviet times and continues into the current legal framework.
It further offers a prediction for the future development of Russia’s labor law and legal culture.
More specifically, Part I discusses the transition of labor laws in Russia, including the creation
and development of the Soviet/Russian Labor Code and its substantive provisions. Part II provides
an overview and analysis of the Russian legal culture and enforcement of its labor law. Part
III compares Russian labor law and enforcement mechanisms with that of the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Mexico. Finally, Part IV provides a conclusion predicting the
future path of Russian labor law and legal culture.
RUSSIA'S LABOR PAINS: THE SLOW
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Even when laws have been written down, they ought not to
remain unaltered.
Aristotle
INTRODUCTION
In the former Soviet Union, a worker was entitled to a job.'
He often found himself, however, locked into a position he
could not easily resign.2 The role of the State was to provide
employment for people, whether those jobs were needed or not.
Salaries were set by the State; there was no competition for work-
ers between enterprises; and the State could not really punish
workers for failing to accomplish the state-established minimum
requirements generally referred to as the "norms."' In fact, sala-
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along with all of my academic work, is dedicated to the precious memory of my father,
Dr. Vladimir Z. Parton. As always, I am truly grateful to my husband and my mother for
their love and support. Furthermore, I would like to thank Professors Adam Ger-
shewitz, Margit Livingston, and Julie Spanbauer for their helpful suggestions. I also
would like to express a special gratitude to my research assistant Kate Marinacci for her
invaluable assistance in preparation of this Article and my thanks go to Igor Dubinsky,
Leah Sullivan, and Darcie Cobden for their help and feedback.
1. See Philip Hanson & Elizabeth Teague, The Political Economy of Unemployment Ben-
efits and Indexation in the Russian Federation, in THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN TRANSITION
290, 293 (Richard F. Kaufman & John P. Hardt eds., 1993) ("Both the Stalin constitu-
tion of 1936 and the Brezhnev constitution of 1977 guaranteed the right of Soviet citi-
zens to work, but neither acknowledged the corresponding right to choose not to
work."); Amy J. Bliss, Proletariat to Perestroika: A Comparison of Labor Law in the Soviet
Union and the Russian Federation, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 264, 267 (1997) (citing Konst. SSSR
(1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 40 , translated in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 3, 11 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1st ed. 1983)).
2. See MERVYN MATrHEWS, POVERTY IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE LIFE-STYLES OF THE
UNDERPRIVILEGED IN RECENT YEARS 109 (1986); Bliss, supra note 1, at 268-69 (describing
barriers to leaving job); see also WILLIAM MOsKOrF, HARD TIMES: IMPOVERISHMENT AND
PROTEST IN THE PERESTROIKA YEARS 161-62 (1993) (notingjob security during perestroika
era).
3. See STEPHEN E. HANSON, TIME AND REVOLUTION: MARXISM AND THE DESIGN OF
SOVIET INSTITUrIONS 153 (1997) (providing a brief description on creation of work
norms); DAVID GRANICK, JOB RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION: THEIR CONSEQUENCES 91-93
(1987) (providing examples of lax state punishment).
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ries and competition did not play an important role during the
Soviet period (that took place between the years of 1917-91) and
neither did the rule of law, which was rejected in concept be-
cause of its "bourgeois" origin.' Moreover, the population lost
trust in courts and judges, viewing them as objects that the Party
used to control the people.5 Despite all that, the initial 1970
version of the Soviet Labor Code was the official law and contin-
ued to remain in force even after Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power in 1985 and started conducting a number of major struc-
tural economic reforms, commonly known as perestroika.6
After the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on Decem-
ber 31, 1991, it became clear that the post-Soviet Labor Code was
a carryover from the Communist regime, and it was not adapted
to the free market.7 There arose a conflict of realities. Employ-
ees expected the State to take care of them as it always had. The
emergence of free market entrepreneurs and companies, how-
ever, led to a new job market where jobs were no longer created
for employees; instead, companies sought qualified applicants.'
The high rate of unemployment, as well as a shortage ofjobs and
pay, led to a rapid decrease in the average standard of living and
welfare of society.' The law finally changed in 2002 to accommo-
date the realities of the emerging free market, but it still re-
tained some of the nuances of its Soviet grandfather. Scholars
disagree on whether the existing law is effective and properly
4. See DONALD FILTZER, SOVIET WORKERS AND THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA: THE
SOVIET LABOUR PROCESS AND GORBACHEV'S REFORMS, 1985-1991, at 58 (1994) (wages
and competition); DAVID SATTER, DARKNESS AT DAWN: THE RISE OF THE RUSSIAN CRIMI-
NAL STATE 37 (2004) (dismissal of legal institutions).
5. KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR
LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION 137-38 (1996) ("[Soviet law was viewed] as a one-way projec-
tion of state authority that reflected the interests of those in power. Similarly, the
courts were expected to toe the line. [Their] consistent failure to stand up to the Party
... undoubtedly contributed to undermining the courts' legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry."); see also id. at 122-26 (detailing Party influence over courts in pre-perestroika
era).
6. See id. at 53 (explaining duration of 1970 labor law); Bliss, supra note 1, at 297-
98; see also Ger P. Van Den Berg, Developments in Soviet Labor Law Under Gorbachev, in THE
IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA ON SOVIET LAW 301, 302-03 (AlbertJ. Schmidt ed., 1990) (out-
lining perestroika reform to the Soviet Labor Code under Gorbachev).
7. See Bliss, supra note 1, at 298-311 (describing significant reforms under the 1992
amendments).
8. GEORGE J. NEIMANIS, THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE: A VIEW FROM RIGA
138 (1997).
9. Id.
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serves the needs of Russian society."
This Article offers a general examination and analysis of
Russian labor law, including its historic origin and current status,
and it also examines the existing enforcement mechanisms for
its provisions. It also provides a comparison of Russian labor law
and enforcement to the labor regulations and enforcement in
four other countries: the United States of America, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Mexico. The Article concludes that
Russia's failure to comply with and enforce its labor regulations
is deeply rooted in the culture's historic distrust and disrespect
for the law that was typical during Soviet times and continues
into the current legal framework. It further offers a prediction
for the future development of Russia's labor law and legal cul-
ture. More specifically, Part I discusses the transition of labor
laws in Russia, including the creation and development of the
Soviet/Russian Labor Code and its substantive provisions. Part
II provides an overview and analysis of the Russian legal culture
and enforcement of its labor law. Part III compares Russian la-
bor law and enforcement mechanisms with that of the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Mexico. Finally, Part
IV provides a conclusion predicting the future path of Russian
labor law and legal culture.
I. TRANSITION OF LABOR LAWS IN RUSSIA
The regulation of labor law and capital markets11 reflects a
particular country's political and economic structure. In fact, it
has been concluded that "richer countries regulate labor less
than poorer countries do."12 Moreover, a more substantial regu-
lation of the labor force is associated with a greater "unofficial
10. Compare Bruce W. Bean & Evgeniya Shpak, The Russian Federation, 36 INT'L
LAw. 849, 853-54 (2002) (supporting new labor law as positive) with Bernard S. Black &
Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study of Russia, 10 Sup. CT.
ECON. REv. 211, 248 (2003) (expressing doubt toward efficacy of revised labor law).
11. See Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared With Capital Markets
and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1061, 1061 (1984). The Article provides a discus-
sion of differences between "labor and capital markets" and between "labor and corpo-
rate law." It is of interest that one scholar argues that although there are some differ-
ences between capital and labor markets, "they do not justify the differences between
labor and corporate law." Id. at 1061.
12. Juan Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9756, 2003) (containing survey results that reveal investigation of
labor, market, and social security regulations in eighty-five countries and revealing that
wealthier countries have been found to have "more generous social security systems.").
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economy, lower labor force participation, and higher unemploy-
ment, especially of the young."1 A major distinction between
common and civil law countries' reactions to market failure is
that common law countries normally rely on private contract
and litigation, while civil law countries expect their government
to supervise the market directly.14 Specifically, poor countries
must then issue regulations that protect workers from being ter-
minated by employers, while wealthier countries provide retire-
ment benefits, unemployment insurance, and other protections
that can be covered by raising taxes. 5
A country's labor and employment force regulation, there-
fore, should be studied in the context of the country's history
and legal system; it cannot be analyzed in isolation. This Article
now turns its focus to the development and current status of la-
bor and employment law and its enforcement in Russia.
A. Historic Role of Labor Law in Russia
Similar to classic "civil law" countries, socialist countries rely
on heavy regulations and state ownership. 6 Moreover, countries
that originated through socialism have a much higher level of
regulation than do countries that originated in common law.' 7
Scholars disagree on whether heavy labor regulations are benefi-
cial to the worker. For example, according to some efficiency
theories, "heavier regulation of labor markets should be associ-
ated with better, and certainly not worse, labor market out-
comes." 8 This conclusion, however, has been criticized and
contradicted by a number of empirical studies.' 9 Like other so-
cialist countries, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
13. Id.
14. See id. at 2. When the State takes ownership, the government takes exclusive
control over the activity. Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J.
COMPARATIVrE ECON. 595, 601 (2003).
15. Botero, supra note 12, at 5.
16. See id. at 8. In contrast, common law countries rely on free markets and private
contracts. Id.
17. See id. at 1.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Id. The empirical studies involve variables such as mandatory minimum daily
rest, and days of annual leave with pay in manufacturing (a measure of the length of
the annual paid leave in manufacturing after twenty years of employment). See id. at
Table I. The studies examine countries such as Russia, Romania, India, and the United
Kingdom and they show correlations between the political and economic constraints
and legal origin, using variables. See id. at Tables II, VIII.
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("USSR") 20 government had centrally regulated its employer-em-
ployee relations. 2' As a result, private employment contracts
were of little importance as there was no need to distinguish be-
22tween individual employment contracts. In contrast, private
contracts are of vital importance today as the Russian economy
and political system have undergone a major transition to a mar-
ket-type economy.23 On a bigger scale, the collapse of the social-
ist system has "left the new Russian legislature the formidable
task of rewriting existing laws and formulating new legislation."24
The country's transition from the socialist regime to a market-
oriented economy entailed numerous reforms in the labor and
employment law area.25 In fact, it is argued that Russia's current
labor and employment laws are "much more stringent than
those of other countries with transition economies."26
A major challenge accompanying the transition is the Rus-
sian population's historical lack of faith and commitment to the
rule of law. First, the rule of law was generally rejected during
the Soviet period.27 Second, the Communist Party was able to
influence the courts and control the appointment of judges.28
As such, the people lost trust in the legal system, viewing it as an
object that the Party used to control them.2 9 The population's
lack of faith in the law and courts resulted in its attempts to
elude the written rules whenever possible thus making the envi-
ronment "conducive to illegal labor relations.""° Scholars argue,
however, that the development of the Russian labor market is
distinguishable from other countries that are undergoing transi-
20. After the Communist Revolution of 1917, Russia became a part of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR").
21. Alexander Scharf, Labor Relations of Employees and Managers Under Russian and
Belarussian Law: A Note, 24 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 169, 169 (1998).
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Miriam B. Gottesfeld, The Worker's Paradise Lost: The Role and Status of Russian
and American Women in the Workplace, 14 ComP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 68 (1992).
25. See id.
26. 0. Kirichenko & P. Kudiukin, The Regulation of the Russian Labor Market, 47
PROBS. OF ECON. TRANSITION 73, 79 (James E. Walker trans., 2004).
27. See Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian Legal Culture,
5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 39, 42 (1995) (stating the rule of law was rejected
because of its "bourgeoisie" origin).
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 73.
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tions in their economy, such as Central and Eastern Europe.31
B. Creation & Development of the Russian Labor Code
1. Soviet Time
Some authors have attempted to explore the interconnec-
tion between the "intellectual elite" and regular working people
in the last decade of existence of the Russian Empire. 2 The de-
bate is whether Russian intellectuals and workers were in a "con-
stant dialogue from the reign of Alexander II to the fall of the
imperial system in 1917,""3 or whether "it was the social and cul-
tural differences between [workers and the intelligentsia]" that
"led to ... social and psychological tension that persisted down
to 1917." 34
a. Soviet Labor Code of 1970
After the Revolution of 1917, the focus of the newly-estab-
lished country of the USSR became the socialist system of owner-
ship and socialist economy.3 5 Supporters of the socialist regime
claimed that their political system "[made] the exploitation of
labour in any form impossible '36 because the workers "[did] not
31. See Olga Rymkevitch, The Codification of Russian Labour Law: Issues and Perspec-
tives, in CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & MODERNISATION OF LABOUR LAw 337 (Roger
Blanpain & Manfred Weiss eds., 2003). Scholars often disagree over the main reasons
for these differences. See id. Some experts argue that the "shock therapy in Russia has
not entailed the same sweeping reforms as it has in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Slovakia." Id. It appears that the new Labor Code has been partly influenced by
the labor relations of other countries in Western Europe. Id. at 351 (footnote omitted).
In order to better understand the special features of the Russian Labor Code, it is im-
portant to obtain an in-depth understanding of the social and economic characteristics
of Russia. Id.
32. See Daniel H. Kaiser, Worker Voices, Elite Representations: Rewriting the Labor His-
tory of Late Imperial Russia, 34J. Soc. HIsT. 699, 699 (2001); see also REGINALD E. ZELNICK,
LAw AND DISORDER ON THE NAROVA RIVER: THE KREENHOLM STRIKE OF 1872, at 2-3
(1995); WORKERS AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN LATE IMPERIAL RussIA: REALITIES, REPRESENTA-
TIONS, RELFECrIONS 1, 226 (Reginald E. Zelnick ed., 1999).
33. Kaiser, supra note 32, at 700 (quoting Zelnick).
34. Id. (quoting WORKERS AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA: REALITIES,
REPRESENTATIONS, RELFEcrIONS, supra note 32, at 186). 1917 is the year when the Rus-
sian Socialist Revolution lead by Vladimir Lenin took place.
35. See R. LIVSHITZ & V. NIKITINSKY, AN OUTLINE OF SOVIET LABOUR LAw 34 (1977).
[S] ocialist economic system and socialist ownership of the means of production, firmly
established as a result of liquidation of the capitalist system, the abolition of private
property in the means of production, and the ending of exploitation of man by man."
Id. (citing Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution]).
36. Id.
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work for an owner-exploiter, but for themselves, [and] all Soviet
people."37 They further claimed that there was "no class strug-
gle" in the USSR 8 and there was no unemployment there, nor
could there ever be.39
The Soviet labor and employment system was heavily regu-
lated during that time and "reflected the centralism of the social-
ist structure and command economy."4 The Constitution of the
USSR outlined the specifics of permissible labor contracts and
worker rights.4 The legislation introduced a guaranteed right
to work for all adult citizens of the USSR and it also imposed a
duty to work.42 If a particular manager or supervisor, for exam-
ple, attempted to enter into a labor contract with an employee
that resulted in a "worse position for the worker"4 than pro-
vided for in the legislation, in terms of salary, number of vaca-
tion days or something else along those lines, that contract
would be considered unenforceable or invalid.44 In fact, it was a
crime for an "adult able-bodied citizen not to work."4 5 Under-
standably, labor and employment law in the former Soviet Union
was a reflection of its ideological views.4 6
On July 15, 1970, the Soviet State adopted its first national
Labor Code,47 a major piece of legislation regulating labor and
employment relations in the former USSR.48 This newly-created
code consolidated all prior labor-related legislation49 and be-
came the governing law regulating the labor market and em-
ployer-employee relations. In fact, according to scholars, the
"nature of labor contracts under this code was the fundamental
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Bliss, supra note 1, at 264, 269.
41. See LIVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 35, at 42.
42. Bliss, supra note 1, at 268.
43. LrVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 35, at 43.
44. Id.
45. Bliss, supra note 1, at 268. (quoting SOVIET C~iMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 80
(HaroldJ. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1972)).
46. C. Scott Holmes, From Workers' State to Work Without Pay: Labor Law Reform in the
Russian Federation, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 341, 348 (1997-98).
47. Id. The Soviet Labor Code was specifically named "The Fundamentals of La-
bour Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics" and it was "the first national
code of labour legislation in the history of the USSR." Id. (citation omitted).
48. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 74.
49. See generally Holmes, supra note 46.
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parameter influencing labor market behavior. ' 5° Overall, the
Labor Code outlined numerous fundamental rights to be exer-
cised by workers, as well as prohibitions and restrictions, which
the government placed on the market. The state ensured the
workers full employment, job security, health care, housing, so-
cial security, and education. 5' Although citizens had the right to
work, they did not have the individual right to choose work,
choose union representation, or negotiate their own employ-
ment contracts. 5 2 Moreover, refusing work was considered a
criminal act against other workers.5" It is of interest, however,
that the right to strike was not included in the Labor Code, and
workers were "effectively denied" such fundamental rights as
"worker rights to organize, bargain, and strike .... "-" The State
was very much in control of the labor market and prohibited
private entrepreneurship.55 Moreover, Russian criminal law
made entrepreneurial activity punishable by incarceration or ex-
ile for up to five years.56
i. Unions and their Role in the Soviet Society
The Labor Code established a number of regulations deal-
ing with trade unions ("unions") 57 and collective bargaining. 58
Most important, it established and outlined the role and rights
of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions ("AUCCTU"),
the State's official union, which was established in order to unify
all existing unions. 59 Under the Soviet system, the unions per-
50. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 74. For example, the Labor Code
specifically regulated the duration of fixed-term contracts. Id.
51. See Holmes, supra note 46, at 353-54 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 354.
53. Id. at 352.
54. Id. at 352-53 (citation omitted).
55. See Bliss, supra note 1, at 275.
56. See id.
57. The Soviet scholars claimed that the "Soviet state has never in its whole history
adopted a law that restricts union fights in any way." LIVSHITZ & NIKTINSKY, supra note
35, at 122.
58. The enterprise's trade union committee frequently concluded and signed col-
lective bargaining agreements with management. Bliss, supra note 1, at 280. However,
they did so on the labor collective's behalf and only after the collective had accepted
the agreement. Id. Collective bargaining agreements were authorized by the Labor
Code and they covered all workers within the labor collective. Id. at 281. Such agree-
ments were limited to social benefits because "terms and conditions of employment
were established by State planning." Holmes, supra note 46, at 352 (citation omitted).
59. Holmes, supra note 46, at 349.
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formed many tasks that "would be functions of management
under market economies."6 Examples of such tasks included
distribution of social goods and various benefits, including hous-
ing, food, clothing, and cars.6 ' More specifically, the unions op-
erated as organizational appendages of state control in partner-
ship with management. 62 For example, the Code allowed the
unions to initiate relevant legislation and to work with various
high authorities and enterprises on fixing wages for workers and
creating and improving working conditions.63
It was the unions' responsibility to protect workers' safety by
ensuring that working conditions were in compliance with safety
regulations.64 The management of a particular enterprise had
to provide its union, free of charge, with premises for holding
staff meetings and all the necessary equipment, such as a phone
line, heating and cleaning.6" Moreover, all property that was
owned or rented by the enterprise was at the union's disposal
free of charge, along with its maintenance and upkeep, and it
was financed by the enterprise.66 In addition, enterprises were
required to allocate funds to unions at a rate of fifteen percent
of their wages for "mass cultural work and sport activities."67
In order to promote employees to executive positions, man-
agement had to receive the union's approval.68 Furthermore,
managers were obligated to terminate an executive employee at
the request of the trade union if the union asserted that he had
violated labor legislation in some way, had not fulfilled his obli-
60. Id. at 350. Most working citizens automatically became members of trade un-
ions. Bliss, supra note 1, at 280.
61. Holmes, supra note 46, at 350-51.
62. See id. at 350-51. "In addition to management responsibilities, union leader-
ship was co-opted by management." Id.
63. Id. (citations omitted). Trade unions appointed committees, which operated
at the actual work places and represented them at the enterprise level. Bliss, supra note
1, at 279. The law enabled the committees to take on various responsibilities affiliated
with the administration of labor decisions. Id. They represented the interests of work-
ers by managing issues of grievances with management, distribution of employee bene-
fits et cetera. Id. Overall, they played a key role in the day-to-day operations of the labor
infrastructure. Id.
64. Holmes, supra note 46, at 351. In addition, the unions administered social
insurance for the workers by managing various social programs that included cultural,
tourist, and educational facilities. Id.
65. LIvsHITz & NIKITINSKY, supra note 35, at 122.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 126.
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gations in his collective bargaining agreement or had "resorted
to bureaucratic methods."69 This obligation was legally binding
on the management and they were not in a position to disregard
it.7 ° However, there was no judicial remedy for challenging such
decision. The only permissible appeal was to a higher trade
union body, which would be able to issue a final determina-
71tion.
ii. Role of the Labor Collectives and Brigades
Distinguishable from the trade unions, labor collectives 72
were elected by members of each enterprise.7 3 They consisted of
management and executives that met bi-annually, while their
specially-designated councils met more frequently.7" The role of
labor collectives was very broad; they took part in discussions and
resolutions of various state and social affairs.75 Creation of labor
collectives basically was another expression of the need to allow
workers to participate in enterprise management. 76
In order to organize and structure production within a par-
ticular enterprise, the brigades system was implemented.77 The
brigades were considered to be the "'lowest production entity in
the enterprise,' which 'contract[ed] with management to per-
form production planning tasks,' thereby replacing a system of
issuing tasks to individual workers."7 The upside, however, was
that the brigades represented "small organizational units within
an immense labor bureaucracy" in the former Soviet Union.7 9
iii. Permissible Contracts Under the Labor Code
The nature of permissible labor contracts established under
the Labor Code was the "fundamental parameter influencing la-
69. Id. at 126-27.
70. Id. at 127.
71. Id.
72. "Trudovoi kollektiv" is the Russian term; "labor collective" is its translation. Bliss,
supra note 1, at 279 n.121.
73. Id. at 280.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 282.
78. Id. (quoting W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAw 231 (2d ed. 1988)).
79. Id.
2009]
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bor market behavior."8 ° The Code was very strict and specific on
the issuance of fixed-term contracts to make sure employers
were not avoiding having to provide employees with specific ben-
efits that they were entitled to under an indefinite-term con-
tract.81 Accordingly, the Code initially limited a fixed-term con-
tract to a maximum of three years (later increased to five) and
stipulated that extending the terms would automatically transi-
tion them into indefinite contracts.8 2 Although theoretically a
worker had the freedom to negotiate his own contract, the real-
ity limited him to negotiating his "sphere of activity,"-i.e., the
actual functions he was going to perform.83 If a worker decided
to waive any of the rights provided to him by the labor legisla-
tion, that contract became invalid.84
Labor disputes were addressed by either a special labor dis-
pute85 or trade union committee.86 The other alternative review-
ers were either town or district courts.8 7 The labor dispute com-
mittees, however, were the required first step to examine labor
disputes.88 Such disputes had to be resolved on a group/collec-
tive basis and dealt with a broad range of employment-type is-
sues, while individuals had no such authority. 89
High administrative barriers protected workers from losing
their jobs.90 Management-initiated layoff decisions required the
approval of trade unions.91 Moreover, existing labor regulations
"did not envision layoffs due to fluctuations in market conditions
or cyclical factors."92 It was also incredibly difficult to fire a
worker for poor performance:9" terminating a worker deemed
80. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 74.
81. Id. at 75.
82. Id. at 74-75.
83. LIVsHITz & NIKITINSKY, supra note 35, at 41.
84. Id. at 43.
85. Labor dispute committees ("LDC") were composed of "an equal number of
permanent members of the local union committee and of the management." Bliss,
supra note 1, at 283 (quoting V. Glazyrin et al., SOVET EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS IN LAw 169
(James Riordan trans., 1978)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 76.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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incompetent to do the job required both following stringent
procedures and offering the employee another position.94
Management had no power to terminate a worker, and it
could only recommend termination.9 5 The final decision was to
be reached by the trade union committee and had to be in writ-
ing and established by majority vote.9 6 If the trade union disap-
proved dismissal of a worker, however, its decision was final and
irreversible, and not subject to judicial review or appeal.97 The
procedural structure obviously favored employees, because, un-
like the management, a terminated worker could appeal the de-
cision to court.98 Generally, grounds for termination under the
Code included the following: shutting down of the enterprise or
staff reduction, unfitness for the position, constant failure to
carry out work-related duties, absenteeism from work, and over-
extended absence due to temporary incapacity.99 When a
worker was dismissed involuntarily, he was entitled to severance
pay for two weeks. 00 In contrast, a worker was permitted to re-
sign his position subject to providing two week's notice."' In an
instance when the labor contract was fixed-term, an employee
could resign only for valid reasons, such as sickness, disability,
violation of labor legislation, or other.1 2 Only the investigating
body, and not the administration, had a right to suspend an em-
ployee. 103
Employers were allowed to include a probationary period in
their agreements. This allowed them to hire workers with less
risk and offered an employee the opportunity to prove himself
in order to receive an official offer of employment. 0 4 Transfer
94. Id.
95. Bliss, supra note 1, at 273.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. LLVSHITZ & NIKITINSKY, supra note 35, at 52-57.
100. Id. at 62. To qualify for severance pay at the termination of one's contract,
the Labor Code specifies the following grounds: "1) call-up or enlistment in military
service; 2) refusal to transfer to work in another locality together with the enterprise; 3)
the closing down of enterprise or reduction of staff, 4) unfitness for the job because of
inadequate qualifications or poor health; 5) reinstatement of the worker previously oc-
cupying the job." Id.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 52.
103. Id. at 63.
104. Id. at 46.
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to "anotherjob in another enterprise" was permissible only if the
employee gave his consent. 10 5
iv. Protection of Women, Graduates, and Minors
Special protection was extended to women and minors
under the Code. Specifically, it was forbidden to dismiss "preg-
nant women, nursing mothers or mothers with children under
one year of age."' 6 The only exception to this restriction was a
complete shutdown of the institution or enterprise. 10 7 Minors
also enjoyed special privileges. Generally, one had to be sixteen
years old to work, although it was possible to start working at
fifteen, provided there was consent of the union.'0 8 Using a pro-
bation period for minors was not allowed.' 9 Dismissal of a mi-
nor was allowed only in exceptional cases, provided other work
was found for them"'
Unlike other workers, graduates did not have the same free-
dom to choose the type of job they would perform. 1 ' Upon
graduation, they were directed to a place of employment where
they were required to work for at least three years. 112 The ad-
ministration could not refuse to hire a graduate and did not
have a right to terminate a graduate during that initial three-year
term, unless the special consent of the applicable ministry was
provided." ' All places of employment had required quotas of
available vacancies for employment and training of graduates
and young people less than eighteen years of age." 4
2. Post-Soviet Transition
Up until February 1, 2002, the main legal framework regu-
lating labor and employment structure in Russia was the Soviet
105. Id. at 47. "[Alnotherjob in the same enterprise" was interpreted broadly. Id.
It was construed to include working in a different industry, capacity or qualification or
work in the same capacity but with different scale of payment or level of privileges, etc.
Id.
106. Id. at 60.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 42.
109. Id. at 47.
110. Id. at 60. Exceptions may include shutting down of the enterprise, unfitness
for the job, reduction of labor force, and other. Id.
111. Id. at 166-67.
112. Id. at 167.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 46.
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Labor Code of 1971.115 Despite all the changes and reforms that
took place during the perestroika (restructuring) 116 era, the old
Labor Code, which was based on state ownership, continued to
dominate and regulate the rights and obligations of workers. Ac-
cordingly, it is understandable that the established legal tradi-
tions of the post-communist Russia and former Soviet Union are
considered to be "sufficiently intertwined"'1 7 and "no sharp dis-
tinction is necessary with regard to legal consciousness."" 8
However, a number of amendments and changes were
made to the 1971 Labor Code in order to guarantee the rights of
employees during the transition period." 9  The Code was
renamed to the Code of Laws on Labor of the Russian Federa-
tion.1 21 Overall, the amendments attempted to: expand employ-
ees' rights;12 ' add new grounds for termination of workers; 12 2
115. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 74; see also ASHW]N & CLARKE, Rus-
SIAN TRADE UNIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 106 (2003).
116. After Mikhail Gorbachev was selected as party leader in 1985, he focused on
conducting a number of major structural economic reforms. DAVID MANDEL, LABOUR
AFTER COMMUNISM 11 (2004). Eventually, he decided to take on an even bigger ap-
proach by announcing the beginning of perestroika (restructuring). Id. "The basic idea
was to replace vertical, centralized management of the economy with horizontal, decen-
tralized coordination through the market." Id. The enterprises were to become more
autonomous, while still being state-owned, which "would free up the energy of the cen-
tral government for strategic planning." Id. This would be accomplished through the
"manipulation of macro-economic levels rather than by detailed central planning and
direct intervention into the activity of enterprises." Id. Some authors, however, argue
that the initial steps "toward a Russian market economy were taken by the USSR in the
five years immediately preceding the formal dissolution of the USSR on December 31,
1991." Bruce Bean, Doing Business in the New Russia: Rebirth of the Russian Nation, 35
INT'L LAw. 961, 961 (2001).
117. ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 1985-1996, at 47 (1997).
118. Id.
119. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 74. The amendments were adopted
by order of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1988 and by several Russian
federal laws of 1992 and 1995. AsHWIN & CLARKE, supra note 115, at 106.
120. Bliss, supra note 1, at 298. The Code was formally called the Code of Laws on
Labor of the Russian Republic. Id.
121. Among newly provided protection for workers are the right to choose type of
work; free assistance from the government employment service in arranging work; free
training for a newjob; raising of employment qualifications; compensation for expenses
associated with job transfers; and "legal protections from groundless terminations." Id.
at 302.
122. Article 40, in providing new requirements on the termination of workers,
represents a major step in recognizing the realities of the change to a market econ-
omy." Id. Acknowledging that workers may be terminated in connection with reduc-
tions in the labor force is a huge step for the country where firing a worker was a
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clarify the role of trade unions; 123 provide enforcement mecha-
nisms for collective agreements; 12' and provide specific regula-
tions that define the parameters of labor contracts. 125 In addi-
tion, it changed the terms of leave for women and other bene-
fits. 1 26 All of these changes reflected the legislature's attempt to
recognize the development of a market economy and adjust the
existing law accordingly. Another critical step in the labor move-
ment towards a market economy was the establishment of
BUTEC People's Concern. In 1990, the Soviet Council of Minis-
ters established BUTEC, this allowed its members to purchase
and run enterprises and conduct their own market relations. 127
It is argued that legislation regulating labor had been completely
ignored by economic operators and eventually led to the col-
lapse of the central role occupied by the State resulting in enor-
mous wage reduction as well as mass unemployment. 12
The 1990s are commonly characterized as years of eco-
nomic crisis and despair in Russia. 129 Many employees had lost
"relatively rare practice." Id. at 302-03. In regards to the revised employment provi-
sions, one author, however, argues that "in effect the new list is essentially the old list,
with a handful of new reasons included .... " Rymkevitch, supra note 31, at 350.
123. The description of trade unions was reduced from dozens of paragraphs to
one that could possibly be explained by the legislature's intent to "weaken the trade
union committees' roles by not specifying their duties in the code." Bliss, supra note 1,
at 299. In addition, the "trade union committee" was renamed to "trade union organ."
Id. This change possibly envisions a "more flexible labor system with a wider variety of
representative trade union bodies." Id.
124. Overall, the 1992 amendment to Article 244 moves the enforcement mecha-
nisms away from centralized control over labor. Id. at 311. Specifically, it removes any
reference to Soviets of People's Deputies and strikes specific duties of "ministries, state
committees and departments" in exercising control over complying with proper labor
legislation. Id.
125. The new amendment increased the permissible length of a fixed-term em-
ployment contract from three to five years and prohibited short-term contracts unless
specific provisions were met. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 74-75. Another
example of a modification is the new requirement of putting all labor/employment
contracts in writing. Id.
126. Id. at 77.
127. Bliss, supra note 1, at 287-88.
128. Rymkevitch, supra note 31, at 336 (citing Memorandum from Mironov, Analy-
sis of Legal Regulation of Labour in the Russian Federation, International Conference on
Social and Labour Issues: Overcoming Adverse Consequences of the Transition Period
in the Russian Federation, Moscow, (Oct. 6, 1999), available at http://www.hro.org/
ngo/duma/35/index.htm). "This has led to the development of a hidden and parallel
labour market, based on a labour relations philosophy that was contra legem when com-
pared to the traditional Soviet system that was characterized by full employment and a
lack of illegal work." Rymkevitch, supra note 31, at 336.
129. See Holmes, supra note 46, at 34142.
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their jobs during mass discharges or were not getting paid for
extended periods of time while retirees were not receiving their
pensions. 30 One author's view is that the
political lesson to be learned from the Russian experience is,
when the state attempts to be the people's benefactor and
provide everyone with instant welfare, and does so by substi-
tuting a system of state-owned property and a planned econ-
omy for a system based on private property ownership and a
market economy, the result is misery and tyranny.13'
3. The 2002 Version of the Labor Code (Key Rights)
The new Labor Code of the Russian Federation became ef-
fective in February 2002.132 Although it "retains many of the
protective and regulatory features of its Soviet predecessor," it
arguably differs radically from the old version in its definition of
the fundamental principles of labor legislation.3 3 Upon enact-
ment, the new Labor Code was viewed as a "welcome and signifi-
cant improvement of the investment climate in Russia."'3 4 The
initial hope was that the new Code would strike a balance be-
tween the interests of all kinds of management and workers.1 35
In comparison to the old Labor Code, the new one is a "compro-
mise between the interests of businesses and the interests of em-
ployees"'36 and it represents a "more modern and detailed piece
of legislation. '13 7 At a first glance, the new Code "removes the
hyper-protection employment system" of the past that was
viewed as a "total denial of market economy principles," thus tak-
ing a more liberal approach to employer-employee relations. 138
Some scholars, however, argue that a further examination of the
Code reveals that the new legislation addresses "deep and radical
130. See id.
131. Alexander M. Yakovlev, Russia: On the Crossroad of Histoly, 11 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 1, 10 (1997).
132. Kirichenko & Kudiukin, supra note 26, at 81. The new Labor Code became
effective after it was ratified by President Vladimir Putin in December 2001.
Rymkevitch, supra note 31, at 338.
133. AsHWIN & CI.MAV, supra note 115, at 112.
134. Bruce W. Bean & Evgeniya Shpak, The Russian Federation, 36 INT'L LAW. 849,
855 (2002).
135. Id.
136. Anton Maltsev & Stanislav Djavrunov, Russia, 41 IrNr'L LAw. 825, 838 (2007).
137. Id. at 839.
138. Rymkevitch, supra note 31, at 335-36.
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changes that began prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.' '1 39
In contrast, others claim that the new Code is ineffective as it
failed to adapt to the new Russian economy in transition.140
Moreover, some experts believe that the Code is inflexible; it
failed to resolve old problems in the law; and it turned out to be
"unjustifiably compromised. 141
The new Labor Code is described as a "shift towards in-
creased autonomy for trade unions and employers associa-
"1142tions. In fact, some scholars contend that this legislation ac-
tually brought labor law into the overall framework of civil law,
while others maintain this argument is unpersuasive because
they believe the employment agreement will always remain
within its own set of rules. 143 Overall, the new Labor Code pro-
vided a number of substantive changes. Among major new
changes are the following: first, the Code offered new grounds
that allow employers to terminate their employees thereby giving
employers rights over the dismissal of workers. 144 Second, the
new Labor Code set the minimum wage as the "subsistence mini-
mum for an able-bodied adult.' 1 45 Third, the Labor Code intro-
duced a number of significant improvements in workers' rights
when it comes to the payment of wages.' 4 6 Among other exam-
ples of new regulations, the new Labor Code supersedes any pre-
viously established employment agreements. 147 Specifically, it
provides minimum guarantees to employees that they are enti-
tled to under any circumstances. 148 Employment agreements
must specify all duties and obligations under the contract. 49 It
is required that the duration of employment agreements be in-
definite unless it can be demonstrated that the contract falls
139. Id.
140. Kirichenko & Kudiuikin, supra note 26, at 81.
141. Id.
142. Rymkevitch, supra note 31, at 338.
143. See id. at 339.
144. Bean & Shpak, supra note 134, at 853-54. But see Kirichenko & Kudiukin,
supra note 26, at 82 ("No significant positive changes (in comparison with the 1971
Labor Code) were made in the regulation of layoffs at management's initiative. As
before, possibilities for firing employees were limited to a fixed list of causes.").
145. AsHWIN & CLARKE, supra note 115, at 113.
146. Id. at 112-13.
147. BAKER & McKENZIE, DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA 55 (2006).
148. Id.
149. Id at 55-60 (describing various minimum guarantees to employees).
RUSSIA'S LABOR PAINS
within one of specifically outlined exceptions. 50
As to its structure, the Labor Code consists of general provi-
sions of labor relations, 15 1 collective bargaining,1 52 employment
contracts, 15 work and rest time,154 salary,155 guaranteed rights
and compensation, 15' discipline and training, 157 work safety, 1
58
and sanctions for damage to property. 15
9
Although it has been acknowledged that the New Code con-
tains a number of mechanisms "intended to make labour rela-
tions and industrial relations in Russia much more flexible,"'
' 60
there have been many challenges in that regard.' 6' The most
obvious obstacles, which are difficult to regulate, are substantial
law evasion rates (that actually worsened over time because of
the weak sanctions imposed on lawbreakers) and the weak posi-
tion of trade unions. 162
II. RUSSIAN LEGAL CULTURE & ENFORCEMENT OF ITS
LABOR LAW
A. Is the Existing Labor Law Effective and Properly Enforced?
The first issue to analyze is whether the current labor law is
effective in theory and suits the overall needs of the Russian
economy and society. Scholars disagree on whether the existing
body of Russian labor law is efficient and progressive. According
to Oleg Shein, a member of the Russian State Duma, the new
Labor Code is "progressive" because it offered protection to the
workers and emphasized the role of trade unions.'63 The new
code requirement that employers "include workers in economic
management" is often viewed as a very positive development.'6 4
150. Id. at 55.
151. Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor Code] art.1 (Russ.).
152. Id. art. 24.
153. Id. art. 56.
154. Id. arts. 91, 106.
155. Id. art. 129.
156. Id. art. 164.
157. Id. art. 189.
158. Id. art. 209.
159. Id. art. 232.
160. RVMKEVITCH, supra note 31, at 351 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Stephen James Kerr, Where Mike Harris Got His Labor Code: Russian Workers
Taste IMF's Poison Pill, 35 CANADIAN DIMENSION 14, 14 (2001).
164. Id.
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Moreover, by "using the courts, [the workers] have won victories
against their employers because the law is the law."165 On the
other hand, Svetlana Bailbodorova, an opponent of the new La-
bor Code, claims that the existing employer-employee relations
are illegal and violate the law leading this new labor legislation
to result in "criminal exploitation of Russian workers."' 66
In terms of its written provisions, the Labor Code has been
criticized for purely outlining permissible boundaries that are
appropriate to an employer and employee in a labor contract
but fail to establish each participant's specific commitments or
obligations. 167 On a bigger scale, many scholars are unwilling to
accept the fact that the new labor code was an amendment of a
previous labor legislation that was initially adapted during com-
munism.168 Even some Russian scholars believe that the "preser-
vation of numerous elements from an outdated labor law at a
time of real change in labor relations impedes the development
of a market economy in Russia and results in numerous negative
consequences.
' 16 9
Historically, legal developments do happen over time and it
is of no surprise that experts are skeptical and critical of adjust-
ing the old legislation to a brand new stage of a country's eco-
nomical development. It is well-known that Russia has gone
through political and social changes of implausible proportion
in the last twenty years. Moreover, those changes are still in pro-
gress today and the law is arguably unable to keep up with these
developments. As such, every attempt to adjust and amend the
law should be viewed as a step in the right direction. The big
question, however, remains whether the new amended legisla-
tion is being properly enforced. If the law is only present in the
books and not widely followed, it is obviously ineffective, thereby
making any specific changes or provisions completely unimpor-
tant. The big issue then becomes whether the existing enforce-
165. Id.
166. Id. Svetlana Bailborodova is a member of Zashita Truda (Defense of Labor),
a joint organization combining unions across Russia. Id.
167. S. Iu. Barsukova, Formal and Informal Employment: A Paradoxical Similarity
against the Background of Obvious Differences, 44 Soc. REs. 64, 65 (2005).
168. See, e.g., RYMKEATCH, supra note 31, at 336 (stating that the new legislation
appears to mostly focus on "deep and radical changes that began prior to the collapse
of the Soviet Union.").
169. Igor V. Zenkin & Pavel M. Kudiukin, The Reform of Labor Relations in the Rus-
sian Federation: Problems and Prospects, 26 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 175, 175 (2000).
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ment mechanisms provide for proper implementation proce-
dures of the new labor law in Russia. Even if such mechanisms
are effective in theory, the society has to have an appreciation
for the importance of the law and be prepared to enforce and
follow its specific regulations. So the question becomes whether
Russian society is prepared to do so. To answer this question, it
is important to analyze the specific rights stated in the Labor
Code and whether they are being enforced.
For example, the initial version of the Labor Code stated six
permissible reasons to discharge a worker upon a decision of the
management. 170 In 1991, that number was expanded to nine
and included both disciplinary and non-disciplinary related rea-
sons.171 Dismissed workers had a right to challenge such actions
in court. 7 2 If a worker prevailed, the available remedy was rein-
statement.173 Examination of the Russian labor law in the 1980s
demonstrates that the laws dealing with dismissals and transfers
were "rigorously implemented." 174 In fact, an initial inspection
of available court documents suggests that the courts took the
labor legislation seriously and did their best to guarantee and
enforce workers' rights.175 However, this was far from reality.
For example, in 1991, a revision was added to the legislation that
required the "preliminary consent of the profkom ' 176 in any in-
170. KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATrER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR
LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION 53 (1996).
171. Id. The recent version of the Labor Code states fourteen reasons that make it
legitimate to fire a worker. See Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor Code] art. 81 (Russ.).
Those reasons include dissolution of the company, staff reduction, employee inability
to perform her task, poor qualifications for performing job tasks, change of company
ownership, failure to fulfill employee obligations on numerous occasions resulting in
disciplinary sanctions, and others.
172. HENDLEY, supra note 170, at 53.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 75.
175. Id.
176. "Profkom" means professional committee. In fact, like many other provisions
in Russian law, the requirement of obtaining consent from projkom happened to have
"little practical effect." Id. at 91. Fcr example, Hendley's review of a seven year record
of trial court proceedings in Russia revealed only two cases where an employee was
reinstated due to a failure to get consent from projkom. See id. In fact, the legal counsel
for one of the enterprises told Hendley that they "long ago became accustomed to
getting prolkom consent before drafting the official dismissal order." Id. at 92. This obvi-
ously takes away the initial purpose for creating profkom which is supposed to be a pro-
tector of workers' rights. See id. at 96. Instead, all it was doing was nothing more than
"rubber-stamp management decisions." Id. at 98. Even a trial judge revealed in private
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stance of worker discharge at the management's initiative. 177 A
closer look at the status of enforcement in the 1980s reveals that
the "legal rights of workers that on paper seemed so well pro-
tected become largely meaningless in practice." 171 Management
was typically able to manipulate the law, in terms of both sub-
stance and procedure while the trade unions were "thoroughly
co-opted by management." 179 Accordingly, the management's
apparent burden of proof was nowhere near what the published
materials suggested and the provisions that were supposed to
protect the rights of workers in that regard actually failed to do
so.18 0 In fact, research revealed that in certain instances, workers
and even their superiors were completely unfamiliar with ex-
isting law or policies. 1 '
Overall, legal scholars commonly agree that labor law did
not fully govern the structure of employment in Russia in the
past.18 2 In fact, the consensus is that the "basic failure was one of
effectiveness."'8 3 Although a number of laws were adopted, the
"most effective ones were ignored."'8 4 Thus, the next logical
question is whether there have been any changes in that regard
and what the status of enforcement has been since that time.
1. Formal v. Informal Labor in Russia
In Russia, there are two widespread employment practices:
official/formal and unofficial/informal employment.1 8 5 That
means the arrangement can be based on either a written con-
tract or an oral agreement8 6 that is not necessarily in compli-
conversation that he believed workers were "trouble-makers" and should be getting
what they deserved. Id. at 102.
177. Id. at 54.
178. Id. at 77.
179. Id.
180. See id. In fact, Hendley's research of layoff cases reveals a "disturbing ten-
dency on the part of the courts to accept the word of management with no questions
asked." Id. at 103. However, "relying on the number of cases filed to prove the pres-
ence or absence of a given phenomenon is problematic in the Soviet context." Id. at
108.
181. See, e.g., id. at 77 (the author's interviews with various heads of Russian facto-
ries in the 1990s revealed that none of them were aware of the current law and policy
that was supposed to affect the operation of their enterprises).
182. See id. at 109-10.
183. AHDIEH, supra note 117, at 50.
184. Id.
185. Barsukova, supra note 167, at 65.
186. The "verbal kind of hiring seems to be a sphere of agreements, the compli-
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ance with the law.18 7 In fact, more and more workers are getting
involved in such informal labor arrangements. 188 This ongoing
"withdrawal of the written law from labor relations has reduced
both social benefits as well as legal protection for workers.'
189
For example, employers that do not have a written contract with
their employees are able to avoid payment of taxes or penalties
for late payment of salaries. 9 ° In addition, employers can force
workers to retire in order to avoid paying severance.' 91 Overall,
such arrangements are characterized by "developed and highly-
specific practices" that usually put employees at a disadvan-
tage. 192
Theoretically, enforcement of labor rights and procedures
stated in the new Russian labor legislation should take place
through individual dispute procedures at the workplace and can
also be supplemented by judicial enforcement in court.193 La-
bor unions are also specifically given an important role in pro-
tecting the rights of workers. 9 4 In fact, the Labor Code specifi-
cally states that employees' labor rights should be protected by
ance with which rests on a shaky foundation of personal whims." Id. at 70. It is not
uncommon for workers under this type of arrangement not to get any paid vacation
time, retirement benefits, or benefits for taking care of a child. Id. at 71.
187. Id. at 65. The main distinction is that under the "formal employment ar-
rangement, the strongest "weapon" the employer has in his hands is the threat of dis-
missal; under the verbal arrangement, the leading practice is not to pay wages until the
job is completed." Id. at 78.
188. Zenkin & Kudiukin, supra note 169, at 176.
189. Id.
190. JOSHUA WILSON, RUSSIAN LABOR: WORKER'S STORIES 1 (School of Russian and
Asian Studies 2005).
191. Zenkin & Kudiukin, supra note 169, at 177.
192. Id. at 176.
193. ASHWIN & CLARKE, supra note 115, at 184. Among others, the new Labor
Code specifically states that one of the main purposes of regulating labor includes "safe-
guarding everyone's right to official state protection of his/her labor rights and free-
doms, including by judicial process . . . " Trudovoi Kodeks [TK] [Labor Code] art. 2
(Russ.). Moreover, the workers are given a specific right to "settlement of individual
and collective labor disputes" and their representatives can even participate in pre-trial
settlements of such disputes. Id. arts. 21, 27. In addition, the new Labor Code specifi-
cally offers anti-discrimination protection, which allows individuals to "petition the fed-
eral labor inspectorate bodies and/or courts applying for restoration of their violated
rights, compensation of the material loss and redress of the moral damage." Id. art. 3.
The Code further specifies that a "person who was refused in conclusion of a labor
agreement" can appeal the decision to the court of law. Id. art. 64.
194. The new Labor Code specifically gives workers the right of "association, in-
cluding the right to organize labor unions and join them in order to protect his/her
labor rights, freedoms and legitimate interests." Id. art. 21.
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the State, trade unions, 195 and employees themselves.' 9 6 Moreo-
ver, the government is supposed to provide "supervision and
control over the compliance with the labor protection require-
ments" in order to "prevent and eliminate" potential
breaches.1 97
Although in theory the labor legislation framework provides
what appear to be appropriate enforcement mechanisms, such
provisions are scattered all over the Labor Code and are vague
and unorganized. Despite these potentially available remedies,
today's reality in the Russian Federation is that "in practice the
means of enforcement legislation are very limited, with only a
small proportion of legal violations being challenged by primary
trade union organizations or uncovered by individual labor dis-
putes."'98 In fact, substantial violations of the labor legislation
were uncovered by researchers and, despite the undisputed sig-
nificance of the new Russian Labor Code, the enterprises do not
adhere to its provisions.' 99
Therefore, the structured formal labor legislation still does
not necessarily govern everyday aspects of employment in the
Russian Federation. No matter how good the law is, it is obvi-
195. "Trade unions have the right to supervise over the observance of the Labor
Code and other legal acts, containing labor regulations by employers and their repre-
sentatives." Id. art. 370.
196. Id. art. 352. In addition, the Labor Code states that, "State supervision and
control over the observance of the Labor Code and other legal acts, containing labor
regulations in all organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation is imple-
mented by the bodies of the Federal Labor Inspection." Id. art. 353. The Federal Labor
Inspection is specially created in order to supervise and control proper observance of
the regulations set force in the Labor Code. Id. art. 356. Among others, its functions
theoretically include receiving employee claims and complaints that refer to alleged
violations of their labor rights. Id. art. 356. Furthermore, the Labor Code specifically
authorizes creation of labor protection services or insuring the presence of a labor pro-
tection expert in organizations employing 100 or more individuals. Id. art. 217.
197. Id. art. 220. It is of interest that some additional protection and enforcement
options are offered to employees for various causes throughout the Labor Code. For
example, in instances where an employer damages her employee's property, that em-
ployee is to submit a request for damage recovery to the employer. Id. art. 235. If the
employee disagrees with the employer's decision on this issue or he did not receive
relief, he then "has the right to take legal actions." Id. art. 235. In an instance of an
employee causing potential damage to the employer, the employer will evaluate the
damage and provide his employee with all relevant documents applicable to the situa-
tion. Id. art. 247. The employee has the right to appeal them as pursuant to the proce-
dure specified in the Labor Code. Id. art. 247.
198. ASHWIN & CLARKE, supra note 115, at 193-94.
199. Id. at 225.
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ously not useful if it is not being followed by the majority of citi-
zens and enterprises. Accordingly, the most important question
becomes why the law is so easily avoided and what, if anything,
can be done in order to ensure proper enforcement.
2. Russian Legal Culture and its Lack of Respect for the Law
We were never without the law, though often we chose to ig-
nore it.
Mikhail Gorbachev, interview of 17 August 1993.200
It is interesting to note that "under the legal theory, a coun-
try's approach to regulation is shaped by its legal tradition. '"20
Unfortunately, "Russians' weak legal consciousness has long
roots in their history, as law has never been admired in Russia, its
role in society considered negligible, if not detrimental. 2 °2 In
fact, the law was simply "an obstacle to be outmaneuvered for
survival's sake. 2 °3 It is common knowledge that the Russian
people "do not like to obey all sorts of rules, laws, instructions or
directives-any kind of previously established regimentation of
behavior. ' 20 4 As a result, the overall mentality of the Russian citi-
zens is that the law does not apply to them.20 5 A closer look at
many enterprises in the Russian Federation demonstrates the
presence of the above-described mentality on an everyday ba-
sis. 2 0 6 Just like in the past, both managers and workers violated
numerous procedures in order to secure their earnings. 207 The
official data reveals that labor legislation violations by employers
amounted to approximately two million per year at the end of
the 1990s. 208
200. AHDIEH, supra note 117, at 13.
201. Botero, supra note 12, at 2.
202. AHDIEH, supra note 117, at 96-97.
203. Id. at 98 n.14.
204. Id. at 199 n.6.
205. Id. at 102-03. It is of interest that the Russian sense of fairness and justice
involves various elements that are "altogether outside a legal framework, including mo-
rality, religion, and social goals." Vladimir Grib, The Legal Profession and Civil Society in
Russia, in RUSSIA'S FATE THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES 145, 151 (Heyward Isham ed., 2001).
206. For example, the management at a Moscow Ball-Bearing factory was discov-
ered to illegally dock worker wages when workers took sick days or leaves of absence
that were permissible under the law. MANDEL, supra note 116, at 45.
207. CLAUDIO MORRISON, A RUSSIAN FACTORY ENTERS THE MARKET ECONOMY 174
(2008).
208. ASHWIN & CLARKE, supra note 115, at 184. In reality, the actual number of
violations probably exceeds the stated amount because numerous violations were never
20091 869
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It is not surprising that this type of mentality and a lack of
appreciation for the importance of the law in society do not
change overnight. As such, the well-established lack of regard
for the law that was historically common in Russia has not under-
gone a major change. Along those same lines, one may wonder
why the Russian people do not make better use of their judicial
system in an effort to enforce their labor rights. As discussed
above, the enforcement mechanisms do exist and are a part of
the law itself. As such, it may be confusing to a Western reader
why Russian citizens would not choose to take advantage of avail-
able provisions and enforce the labor rights they are legally enti-
tled to. The answer similarly lies in the Russian society's historic
disbelief in the power of law and the judicial system. Basically,
the answer takes us back to the "weakness of legal consciousness
in Russia" and its generally "narrow legal culture. "209 As a result,
while the Russian legal system exists, it has been typically viewed
as ineffective 2t ° and "Russian workers are [still] confronted by a
chaotic and poorly regulated labor market, in which securing a
living wage is a major feat. 2 11
However, a number of positive developments are taking
place in Russia and some scholars believe that the "legal basis for
a favorable business climate already exists. 21 2 Moreover, this
reported and unaccounted for. "As in the Soviet period, the systematic violation of
workers' rights may only come to light in the event of an accident or if workers protest,
sending letters and petitions to higher authorities or holding demonstrations, pickets
or strikes." Id. at 185. It is also interesting to note that according to the Corruption
Perception of Transparency International, Russia is the tenth most corrupt country out
of eighty-five. Anders Aslund, Law in Russia, 8 E. EURO. CONSTITUTIONAL REV. 4, 96-101
(1999), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=
print&id=413.
209. AHDIEH, supra note 117, at 95. An interesting example that supports the the-
ory of Russia's historic lack of respect for the law is its landmark writer and cultural
legend Leo Tolstoy's open distrust or even hatred for 'jury trials as well as for legal title
to property, which he believed belonged only to God." Id.
210. See generally Aslund, supra note 208. Interestingly, "[m]any Russian lawyers
feel that we have to create a normal sense ofjustice so that lawyers themselves do not
doubt the importance of the law." Grib, supra note 205, at 151.
211. Svetlana Yaroshenko et al., Gender Differences in Employment Behavior in Russia's
New Labour Market, in ADAPTING TO RUssiA's NEW LABOUR CODE 134, 134 (Sarah Ashwin
ed., 2006). Despite the current status of the law and its enforcement, "[i]n the eyes of
many, the law is not among the critical concerns facing Russia at this juncture in its
history." AHDIEH, supra note 117, at 1. This is obviously a flawed perspective because
without legal stability "no political or economic reform will survive, let alone succeed."
Id. at 2.
212. Bean, supra note 116, at 996.
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lack of respect for the law is arguably changing as the impor-
tance of the courts has "grown rapidly since Soviet times, and
their judgments are often taken as precedent, albeit unofficially,
since it remains irrelevant for parties to refer to these in pro-
ceedings, and courts may not base their judgments on the previ-
ous rulings of other courts.' ' 211 It is important to remember that
a change in mentality in a particular culture does not happen
overnight and even a minor step in a new direction should be
viewed as a potentially substantial one with some anticipated
long-term effects. As such, various developments in the Russian
economy, law, and society can be viewed as substantial back-
ground for the major developments to take place in the future.
III. COMPARISON WITH OTHER LABOR LAW SYSTEMS AND
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
A. Overview of Major Labor Laws and Enforcement Mechanisms in
Other Countries
Having taken a close look at one country's labor code and
its specific enforcement mechanisms, it is worthwhile to examine
basic labor provisions and enforcement options in other parts of
the world. The comparison will likely help one appreciate and
explain potential benefits and downsides of various legal systems
and possibly allow proposed implementation of helpful tech-
niques that have been incorporated elsewhere. The comparison
below will involve labor regulations and enforcement mecha-
nisms in the United States of America, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Mexico. These countries were chosen in an effort
to compare and contrast Russian labor law with both common
law and civil law legal systems. One of the countries chosen,
Mexico, has struggled with its own labor laws. The decision was
also influenced by practical availability of applicable information
and statistics.
1. The United States of America
When it comes to labor and employment law, the United
States has a number of governing federal and state statutes. In
addition, because the United States has a common law legal sys-
213. Diana Tapola, Recent Case Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards in Russia, 22J. INT'L ARB. 331, 331-32 (2005).
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tem, an examination of applicable precedents is also critical to
determining the applicable law in various fact patterns. The
most important federal statutes that regulate issues of employ-
ment law are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,214 the
Equal Pay Act of 1963,215 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),a 6 the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990,217 and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). 218
214. The Act prohibits discrimination based on race/color, sex, religion, and na-
tional origin. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006) (amended
1991). In addition, it prohibits unwanted sexual advances, requesting sexual favors
from the employee, and verbal or physical contact with the employee based on a sexual
nature. Id. The victim of the sexual harassment does not have to be of the opposite sex.
Id. As to religion, the employee is allowed to extend a religious accommodation if
necessary. Id. § 2000(e) (). There must be reasonable accommodation of an em-
ployee's "sincerely held religious practices" if there will be no undue hardship on the
employer. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Religious Dis-
crimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/religion/html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
Furthermore, an employer may not discriminate in hiring an employee because she is
pregnant or because of a pregnancy-related condition. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k). If an
employee is unable to work because of her pregnancy, she is to be treated as any other
temporarily disabled employee would be treated. Id. A pregnant employee must be
allowed to work as long as she can do her job duties. Id. "An employer may not have a
rule that prohibits an employee from returning to work for a predetermined length of
time after childbirth." See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Preg-
nancy Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/pregnancy.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2009). The Act applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (b). In 2007, a total of 61,159 charges had been filed alleging viola-
tions of Tide VII. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges FY 1997-FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
vii.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). In 2007, 53,631 charges alleging such violations
were resolved. Id.
215. The Equal Pay Act stipulates that men and women be given equal compensa-
tion for equal work in the same place of work. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 201
(2006). The jobs do not need to be identical, but equal. Id. This Act provides that an
employer may not pay unequal earnings to men and women who are doing jobs that
require the same ability, effort and responsibility and are performed under comparable
working conditions in the same workplace. Id.
216. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") protects those
who are forty and over from employment discrimination based on age. Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA") of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). The Act applies to
employers with twenty or more employees, including apprenticeship programs, job no-
tices and advertisements. Id. § 11. In 2007, 19,103 charges had been filed alleging viola-
tions of the ADEA, while 16,134 of them were resolved that same year. See The U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
217. This statute prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals who
are qualified but have disabilities. Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2006). It covers employers with fifteen or more employees. Id. § 101 (5) (A).
A person has a disability if he has a physical or mental impairment that significantly
restrictions one or more major life activities, he has a record of having the impairment,
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By enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created a
special administrative agency, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC"), which is responsible for enforcing
laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace. 219 Prior to
1971, the EEOC was in charge of just investigating relevant
claims and then referring them to the Department of Justice. 220
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 gave the EEOC
the power to perform its own enforcement litigation.22' As such,
any employee that claims he was the subject of discrimination in
the workplace can file a claim with the EEOC and, after careful
examination, the EEOC will issue a determination letter and
right-to-sue. 222 The employee then can file the action in federal
or he is viewed as having such an impairment. Id. § 3(2). A capable employee or appli-
cant with a disability is a person who can do the necessary tasks of the job with or
without reasonable accommodations. Id. § 101(8). Reasonable accommodations may
include: making the workplace readily accessible and usable for an individual with a
disability, adjusting the employee's work schedule, obtaining or adapting equipment or
devices, etc. Id. § 101 (9). A reasonable accommodation is one that would not cause an
undue hardship on the employer. Id. § 101(10). An undue hardship is "an action re-
quiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of factors such as an
employer's size, financial resources, and the nature and structure of its operation." Id.
at § 101(10). In 2007, a total of 17,734 charges have been filed alleging violations of
the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1997-FY
2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). That
same year, a total of 15,708 of those claims had been resolved. Id.
218. An employee who is eligible under Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") is
entitled to twelve weeks of leave during a one year period for one or more of the follow-
ing: birth of child; adoption or foster care; caring for spouse, child or parent with a
serious health condition; or because the employee is suffering from a serious health
condition and is unable to perform his/her duties in the workplace. Family Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). The individual is also entitled to have his group
health benefits maintained during the time off. Id. Upon the return after such leave
listed above, the employee is entitled to be restored to the same position of employ-
ment held when the leave started; or be restored to an equivalent position with the
same benefits and pay and other terms of employment. Id. Most employees filing their
claims under the FMLA allege improper termination for seeking FMLA-authorized
leave. See U.S. Department of Labor, 2006 Statistics Fact Sheet, Family and Medical
Leave Act Enforcement, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200631.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2009). In 2006, 2161 complaints have been filed alleging violations of the
FMLA. Id.
219. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (4).
220. Legal Information Institute, Equal Opportunity Commission, http://topics.
law.cornell.edu/wex/equal-employment-opportunitycommission (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
221. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (4).
222. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (5).
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221district court.  In certain instances of what appears to be
profound discrimination, the EEOC may choose to pursue the
case as plaintiff in federal court.224 For example just in 2007, the
EEOC filed 362 enforcement suits in federal district courts.2 25
The EEOC is one of the busiest administrative agencies in
the country. Because the procedure for filing a complaint is very
clear and easy to follow, numerous employees and job applicants
take advantage of this mechanism.226 In addition to the user-
friendly, free of charge procedure, which basically involves con-
tacting the EEOC office at one of its available locations all over
the country, one does not need a lawyer and can follow all these
steps on his own.2 2 7 During 1997-2007, the number of charges
filed has ranged from 75,428 in 2005 to 84,442 in 2002.228
Another similar administrative agency that serves as prelimi-
nary stage for resolving labor conflicts and unfair practices in the
United States is the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") 229 Created pursuant to the National Labor Relations
Act governing relations between unions and employers in the
private sector, the NLRB is charged with the task of investigating
and remedying unfair labor practices, as well as protecting the
rights of employees, employers, and unions. 23 ° A different fed-
eral statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") ,231 which sets
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Litigation Sta-
tistics FY 1997 through FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2009). The 2007 statistics shows that the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") does actually step in as plaintiff in numerous cases where it detects
the alleged profound discrimination.
226. See generally, Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination, The U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/over-
view_charge filing.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
227. Id.
228. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, All Statutes FY 1997-
FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (race discrimination claims amount to
35%-37% of all charges filed for the ten fiscal years.); see The U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics FY 1997 through FY 2007, http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visitedJan. 31, 2009). In 2007, there were a total
of 82,792 charges filed with the EEOC. Id. Of all the charges filed, 72,442 were resolved
by settlement. In 2006, 75,768 charges were filed and 74,308 resolved.).
229. National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
230. Id.
231. Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (The Act requires
employers to pay covered employees who are not otherwise exempt at least the federal
minimum wage and overtime pay of one-and-one-half-times the regular rate of pay. For
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the basic minimum wage and overtime pay, is administered by
the Employment Standards Administration's Wage and Hour Di-
vision within the U.S. Department of Labor.232 Numerous claims
are filed pursuant to this statute. For example, in 2006, over
222,000 workers received a total of US$135.7 million in mini-
mum wages and overtime back payments due to the established
FLSA violations. 233 Of that total amount, US$120.5 million were
granted to workers for back wages payments for violations of
overtime regulations and US$15.2 million for violations of mini-
mum wage requirements. 234
When it comes to issues of retirement, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") establishes the
minimum criteria for most voluntarily instituted pension and
health plans in private industry to give protection to the employ-
ees in the plans. 235 ERISA also includes the Consolidated Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), which provides cer-
tain individuals the right to maintain their health insurance for a
period of time after the loss of employment. 236 The Employee
nonagricultural operations, it restricts the hours that children under age sixteen can
work and forbids the employment of children under age eighteen in certain jobs
deemed too dangerous. For agricultural operations, it prohibits the employment of
children under age sixteen during school hours and in certain jobs deemed too danger-
ous.).
232. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and
Hour Division, Major Laws Administered/Enforced, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/
regs/statutes/summary.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
233. U.S. Department of Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act, http://www.dol.gov/
esa/whd/statistics/200631.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
234. Id.
235. Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (2006). The Employment Retirement Security Act ("ERISA") provides security
for members and beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. Also, individuals who handle
plans must meet certain fiduciary standards under the fiduciary responsibilities speci-
fied in the law. This Act gives those individuals participating in the plan the right to sue
for benefits and breach of fiduciary duty. See U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Ben-
efits Security Administration, January 2006, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/
fs2005enforcementresults.html (last visitedJan. 31, 2009). In 2005 the Employee Bene-
fits Security Administration ("EBSA") "closed 3782 civil investigations with 75.67% re-
sulting in monetary results for plans or other corrective action." U.S. Department of
Labor, Health Plans and Benefits, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2009). In 2005, a total of 258 cases were referred for litigation. See id. In
instances involving disagreements between workers and employee benefit plans, EBSA
has been used to resolve conflicts. See id. In 2005, approximately 160,000 requests were
handled and the recovered benefits through informal resolution of individual claims
amounted to US$88.4 million. See id.
236. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
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Benefits Security Administration Board is in charge of enforcing
and administering these provisions.23 v
All of the enforcement agencies described are overwhelmed
by the number of complaints and work nonstop to address em-
ployment and labor disputes.23 8 In fact, many of the complaints
turn out to be frivolous and do not proceed any further after the
agency's determination. However, unlike in the Russian Federa-
tion, numerous employees take advantage of these available pro-
cedures on a daily basis.2 9 The explanation probably entails a
combination of the clarity, cost-efficiency, and simplicity of the
filing procedures with the citizens' desire to resolve various con-
flicts through the judicial proceedings in the United States. Un-
like Russia, it is well-known that the American culture centers
around a citizen's legal rights and the use of courts and lawyers
to enforce them. Accordingly, distinguishable from the Russian
people, Americans typically take full advantage of their legal sys-
tem and its law-related enforcement mechanisms.
2. The United Kingdom
Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom has nu-
merous administrative agencies, which are responsible for vari-
ous aspects of the enforcement, regulation and service for the
labor market. The National System of Labour Administration
("NSLA") 24 0 is responsible for overseeing all of these labor-re-
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV.
1767 n. 257 (2001).
239. See, e.g., The National Labor Relations Board, Performance and Accountabil-
ity Report, Fiscal Year 2007, at 17 (2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/
shared files/reports/PAR2007/NLRBFY2007_PAR-Final.pdf.
240. Jason Heyes, Labour Administration in the United Kingdom, (Normand Lecuyer
ed., 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/
downloads/gllad/uk.pdf; see About the ILO, International Labour Organization, http:/
/www.ilo.org/global/About the_ILO/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008)
(The Labor Administration works towards "advancing opportunities for women and
men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security
and human dignity."); Heyes, supra note 240, at 11 (the National System of Labour
Administration's ("NSLA") critical issues of operation are delegated to independent
non-departmental public organizations, including Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Service ("ACAS"), Commission for Racial Equality ("CRE"), Equal Opportunities
Commission ("EOC")); Id. at 27 (There are various others agencies that assist with em-
ployment-related issues. For example, Race Relations Employment Advisory Service
("RREAS") has the task of enforcing the government race equality at the workplace
policy); Citizens Advice Bureau, http://www.citizensadvice.co.uk/en/About-Us/What-
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lated bodies in the United Kingdom. Created in 1995, the De-
partment for Education and Employment ("DfEE") contains sev-
eral directorates, including the Employment & Lifelong Learn-
ing & International Directorate,241  which, among other
functions, oversees issues of equal opportunity and employment
policy.24 2 The DfEE represents the United Kingdom to the Eu-
ropean Union on its Employment and Labor Market Commit-
tee.
243
Numerous independent organizations play an important
role in the enforcement and operation of the labor-related laws
and standards. Of special importance is the Advisory, Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Service ("ACAS"), a non-departmental
body, governed by an Independent Council. 244 The ACAS is as-
signed the task of improving working life through better employ-
ment relations.2 4 5 It offers independent service for dealing with
disputes between groups of workers and their employers.24 6 It
also deals with claims of employees claiming denial of rights.24 7
ACAS does not have the power to impose or recommend settle-
ments. 248 It deals with complaints of unfair dismissal, breach of
contract, equal pay, and discrimination. 249 However, a different
organization, the Equal Opportunities Commission ("EOC") is
in charge of promoting equality between men and women and
for reviewing the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal Pay
Act. 25 0 The EOC provides help to individuals intending to take a
We-Do/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (The Citizens Advice Bureau ("CAB") advisors ex-
plain options and possible outcomes for resolving problems in the workplace. The advi-
sors provide specialist information in fourteen different areas, including employment
legislation); see generally Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service ("ACAS"), http:/
/www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=1953 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (In addition,
the Labour Relations Agency is responsible for promoting the improvement of employ-
ment relations in Northern Ireland).
241. The Employment Relations Directorate offers guidance on policy and legisla-
tion involving individual employment rights, work hours, holidays, and pay, as well the
operation of employment agencies. It is also responsible for enforcement of employ-
ment agency law. Heyes, supra note 240, at 5-6 .
242. Id. at 5.
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id. at 33.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 33.
250. Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report & Accounts 2006-2007, at
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case under the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal Pay Act.251
Also, it gives aid for representation at court or an Employment
Tribunal.252 An employment tribunal hears cases involving
work-related legal disputes.253 Filing a claim with the Employ-
ment Tribunals is free of charge. 25" A tribunal initially checks
whether a claim is legitimate and can be heard.255 If there is a
doubt as to whether a claim has basis, a preliminary hearing will
be held to make a determination. 256 A tribunal can order the
employer to pay compensation for discrimination or dismissal
on health and safety grounds.257 If the complainant loses the
case, the tribunal will grant an appeal, although on limited
grounds.258
In addition to various options or seeking relief through
non-governmental bodies and employment tribunals, the Cen-
tral Arbitration Committee ("CAC") is responsible for arbitrat-
ing employment-related disputes that are referred to it by vari-
ous trade unions and employers.259 It also arbitrates unilaterally
under the Union and Labor Relations (Consolidations) Act of
1992.260 Based on the recent Employment Relations Act of 1999,
the CAC has been overseeing and enforcing the new trade union
6, 33 (HC 784), available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0607/
hc07/0784/0784.pdf. The Equal Opportunities Commission was replaced by Equality
and Human Rights Commission in October 2007. See Equality and Human Rights Com-
mission-About Us, http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/aboutus/pages/
aboutus.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
251. HEYEs, supra note 240, at 28.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 32.
254. See generally Directgov-Employment Tribunals, http://www.direct.gov.uk/
en/Employment/ResolvingWorkplaceDisputes/DG_10028122 (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. When it comes to issues of health and safety, the Health and Safety Execu-
tive ("HSE") has the duty of enforcing such legislation on a daily basis under guidance
from the Health and Safety Commission. See HEYEs, supra note 240, at 28; see also Heath
and Safety Commission (HSC) and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Framework
Management Statement (2006), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/how-
wework/management/proposedstatement.pdf.
258. See generally Directgov, supra note 254.
259. Central Arbitration Committee-What is the Central Arbitration Committee,
http://www.cac.gov.uk/what -is cac/what-is.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
260. Central Arbitration Committee-The CAC's Staturtory Duties, http://
www.cac.gov.uk/cac-statutory-duties/cac-statutory.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009)..
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recognition procedures introduced by the Act. 261
Therefore, the United Kingdom has numerous procedures
outlining options for resolving work-related dispute issues.
These procedures for enforcement are easy to follow as many
different organizations are offering employees assistance and ap-
propriate services. The setup is worker-friendly and free of
charge and thus numerous employees take full advantage of the
system. 262 For example, in 2006-07 the ACAS helpline re-
sponded to approximately 850,000 inquiries.26" During the
same period of time, the ACAS settled a total of 105,000 cases
and assisted in over 900 collective disputes (ninety-five percent
of all disputes were resolved with the ACAS's assistance).264
Moreover, the ACAS had successful resolution in ninety percent
of cases and it participated in 134 individual mediation cases
resolving about eighty percent of those cases. 26 5
Similar to the United States and unlike Russia, it is very
common to take advantage of the legal system and protective
laws in the United Kingdom, so workers typically pursue what
they believe they are entitled to when it comes to work-related
disputes.
3. Australia
In Australia, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission ("HREOC") was established by an Act of the federal
Parliament.266 It is an administrative agency that investigates
complaints of discrimination and alleged violations of human
rights. 267 In addition to investigation, it can negotiate and seek
resolution of the dispute. 26  If the claim is not properly re-
261. Id.; see also HEVEs supra note 240, at 35.
262. HEYEs supra note 240, at 33.
263. ACAS, ANNUAL REPORT AND AccouNTs 2006/07, at 5, available at http://
www.ecacas.co.uk.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 5, 28.
266. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 7(1) (Austl.);
see also Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, http://www.humanrights.gov.
au/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
267. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986,
§ 11(1) (aa) (f) (Austl.); see also Law Institute Victoria, http://www.liv.asn.au/public/
legalinfo/employment/employment-Equal.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
268. See Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986,
§ 11(1) (f) (i) (Austl.); see also Law Intitute Victoria, supra note 267.
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solved, it may be referred to the tribunal. 269 The HREOC is con-
sidered to be a neutral third party and the service is free, infor-
mal and easily available. 270 An employee may file a complaint
with the HREOC if he believes he was refused employment, dis-
charged, harassed, denied equal training opportunities, or given
less favorable terms of employment for discriminatory rea-
sons. 271' The HREOC is able to investigate complaints of discrim-
ination based on a number of categories, including: disability,
sex, marital status, sexual harassment, race, ancestry, national or-
igin, religion, and others.2 7 2 In Australia, discrimination in vari-
ous areas of public life, including employment, is illegal. 273 The
disputes are resolved by a conciliation process with its possible
outcome ranging from an apology or reinstatement of a position
to compensation for lost wages. 274 The HREOC applies to ap-
prentices, trainees, part-time, and full-time workers.275  Most
complaints received have to deal with discrimination in employ-
ment.
2 7 6
Similar to the United States and United Kingdom, Australia
uses an administrative agency as a preliminary station for investi-
269. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 11(1) (f) (ii)
(Austl); The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") was cre-
ated and operated in a similar manner to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") in the United States.
270. See Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 34
(Austl.); see also Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, Work Out Your
Rights, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints-information/WOYR.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2009).
271. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 11 (Austl.).
272. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 11(a) (1)
(Austl.), Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, Schedule 1,
Art.1 (a) (Austl.). These anti-discrimination laws cover all employers notwithstanding
the number of employees and they "apply across Australia." Human Rights & Equal
Opportunity Commission, Work Out Your Rights, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/
complaintsinformation/WOYR.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
273. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 3(1), § 6A
(Austl.); see also Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, Complaints Informa-
tion, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints-information/index.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2009).
274. See Law Institute Victoria, http://www.liv.asn.au/public/legalinfo/employ-
ment/employment-Equal.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
275. See Australian Human Rights Commission, Mature Workers: 3. Employers
Guide to Age Discrimination, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/matureworkers/3_employ-
ers.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
276. See Australian Human Rights Commission, Chapter 4: Complaint Handling
Section, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/publications/annual_reports/
2007_2008/chap4.html#4_3 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
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gating and evaluating labor and employment-related disputes.
As in the other two countries, this initial procedure is easy to
follow, free of charge, and does not require the presence of a
lawyer. Accordingly, employees are encouraged to take advan-
tage of it and, just like the EEOC in the United States, the
HREOC is a very busy agency that evaluates numerous com-
plaints on a daily basis.27 7 Similar to the other two countries,
resolution of employment-related disputes can take place in vari-
ous forms, ranging from seeking counseling from the agency to
enforcing one's rights in a court of law. Like the United States
and the United Kingdom, and distinguishable from Russia, the
Australian society is very much accustomed to taking advantage
of its legal system and it is pretty typical for citizens to follow the
above-described procedures with the expectation of arriving at
an appropriate resolution that is mandated by the law.
4. Mexico
Mexico's approach to resolving labor and employment dis-
putes is of special interest because, like Russia and in contrast to
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, Mexico is
a civil law country. Labor matters in the Mexican Republic are
regulated by the Federal Labor Law ("FLL"),278 which creates
277. For example, in 2004 the HREOC received a total of 1036 total complaints.
See Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission, Five Years On: An Update on the
Complaint Handling Work of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission,
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/complaintsinformation/publications/fiveyears on.html.
Out of those, 152 complaints alleged violations of the Racial Discrimination Act, 341
claims were based on the Sex Discrimination Act, 503 complaints dealt with issues in-
volving the Disability Discrimination Act and forty claims alleged violations of the Age
Discrimination Act. Id. As a result of the HREOC's involvement in 2004, 42% of all
claims were conciliated; 21% referred/terminated with no reasonable prospect of con-
ciliation; 27% declined/terminated; and 10% of all complaints were withdrawn. Id.
Among others, the following payments were obtained that same year: US$5250 for ra-
cial discrimination; US$5700 for sex discrimination, and US$5000 for disability discrim-
ination. Id. At the end of 2004, 66% of all claims that attempted conciliation were
successfully resolved. Id.
278. The Federal Labor Law in Mexico regulates "labor contracts, minimum
wages, employee benefits and union activity." Mexico Connect, Mexico Labor Market
and Laws, http://www.mexconnect.com/mex laborlaw.html (last visitedJan. 31, 2009).
It "prohibits child labor, mandates an eight hour work day, overtime pay, obligatory
holidays, vacations, wages paid in cash, severance pay, the responsibilities of workers
and employers, and mandatory profit sharing." Mexicanlaws.com, http://
wwv.mexicanlaws.com/STPS/laborlaw.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); see also 1 JORGE
A. VARGAS, MEXICAsN LAw: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL
INVEsToRS 153 (1998).
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minimum rights and responsibilities for employees and employ-
ers. 2 7 9 The Federal and State Labor Boards are in charge of
finding solutions for disagreements arising between an employer
and employee. 2 0 It is very important to note that unions play a
very important and highly political role in the Mexican labor
market. 281
The Board of Conciliation and Arbitration (Labor Board)
serves as an enforcement mechanism for labor regulations. 28 2 A
worker can file a complaint with the Labor Board for considera-
tion.283 If an employee prevails, he will be reinstated to his previ-
ous position plus he will be eligible for "all back wages that were
incurred while the court process was going on. ' 2 84 Just like simi-
lar organizations in other countries discussed above, the Labor
Board is very busy handling workers' claims on a daily basis.285
All workers in Mexico can receive free legal advice from the Fed-
279. See Mexican Federal Labor Law, http://laboris.uqam.ca/babillard/
mexlaborlaw.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); see also VARGAS, supra note 278, at 153.
280. Mexican Federal Labor Law, supra note 279 (noting the federal and state
labor authorities are entrusted with administrative functions, mainly with the "supervi-
sion and application of the FLL regulations."); see also VARGAS, supra note 278, at 182.
281. See generally Mexico Connect, supra note 278. "Labor unions are recognized
under the Federal Labor Law as a means of the employees uniting to protect their
common employment rights." Mexico Law Labor, Labor Relations in Mexico, http://
www.mexicolaw.com/Lawlnfo 11.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
282. See Mexico Connect, supra note 278. The Labor Board is responsible for reso-
lution of labor disputes between employees and employers. Commission for Labor Co-
operation, Guide to Resolving Labor Disputes in Mexico 3, http://fr.naalc.org/mi-
grant/english/pdf/mgmexrlden.pdf (last visitedJan. 31, 2009). After a complaint has
been filed, it will initially attempt to reach an agreement between an employee and
employer via conciliation. Id. There are no lawyers involved at that stage. Id. If success-
ful resolution does not take place, the next stage of the proceeding involves proving
that the allegations are true and lawyers may be present. Id.
283. See generally Mexicanlaw.com, supra note 278.
284. Mexico Law Labor, supra note 281, para. 5.
285. It is of interest to examine the 2007 annual report for Federal Mitigation and
Arbitration Board for Labor Disputes. See 2007 Federal Mitigation and Arbitration
Board for Labor Disputes Ann. Rep. pages. (Lorena Sander, trans.). In terms of Collec-
tive Disputes, the report states that there were 360 cases, mostly resolving differences
within unions with fifty-eight recounts to determine how many members a union had
(the union with most members typically negotiates the union contract with manage-
ment). Id. Also in 2007, out of 8106 calls to strike, 4936 were successfully mitigated;
issues relating to thirty-six strikes have been settled and forty are still pending. Id. In
addition, a total of 28,750 claims dealing with contracts issues have been filed. Id. The
2007 report also states the following figures: administration of justice-individual con-
flicts: a total of 146,762 cases with the 24.1% increase from 2006; special panels-a
total of 62,898 cases filed; and mitigation-a total of 12,510 disputes resolved. Id. Fi-
nally, 579 complaints were brought against Labor Tribunal. Id.
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eral Public Labor Defender's Office ("FPDO") .286 The FPDO
will provide assistance in finding solutions to employment-re-
lated disputes, such as dismissals, legal benefits, general employ-
ment conditions, discriminatory treatment on the job, and
others. 287 If a worker requests, the FPDO will represent him in
front of the Labor Board. 2
Although the Mexican unions initially resemble the Russian
trade unions and the involvement of various organizations may
be compared to the Russian profkom, the Mexican procedure for
enforcement of labor rights is much more organized and easy to
follow. 2 89 In addition, the Mexican unions are committed to en-
forcing the rights of workers, while the management in Russia
seems to be able to manipulate every step of the process, includ-
ing the participation of the unions, and insert its version of the
story even in court, thus making it not worthwhile for Russian
workers to fight for their rights. 29 0 Also, similar to the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the Mexican culture
seems to be accustomed to enforcement of one's legal rights,
thus making it distinguishable from the Russian mentality that
lacks faith in the rule of law. 29 1 As a result, despite being a civil
law country, the approach to enforcing its citizens' labor rights
in Mexico resembles such historically common law countries as
the United States and the United Kingdom, while being differ-
ent from Russia, another civil law country. The differences
mostly lie in the approach to enforcing one's legal rights in a
court of law or available alternative, and in the actual structure
of the enforcement mechanisms.
B. Why is Russia's Law Enforcement so Different from
Other Countries?
The analysis reveals that, unlike Russia, other countries are
able to take substantial advantage of their labor and employment
286. Commission for Labor Cooperation, supra note 282, at 1.
287. Id. at 2.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See generally Scharf, supra note 21.
291. For example, the Mexican Constitution calls for employer-employee disputes
to be settled by the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration with the Board to be com-
prised of an equal number of workmen and employers with one being from the Govern-
ment. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Constitution] (Mex.), as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917.
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provisions. It is of interest that this is true of all three common
law countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Aus-
tralia), as well as a civil law country (Mexico). The explanation
lies in a combination of various factors. First, the Russian Labor
Code appears to be a more complex and less user-friendly type
of legislation than its equivalents in other countries. Most im-
portant, although a number of organizations are involved with
potential violations and enforcement issues, there seems to be
no single authority that would be delegated control of enforce-
ment and given the task of providing assistance to employees all
over the country. Unlike other countries discussed, there is no
particular office or website that would assist the Russian workers
with enforcing their labor rights free of charge. Instead, there
are various entities that can potentially participate but do not
really have a strong record of the same. As such, the enforce-
ment process is less clear and more complicated. Moreover, as
previously discussed, Russia has a cultural history of rejecting the
law and failing to take advantage of the existing legal system. As
a result, numerous violations of the labor law go without a rem-
edy with many enterprises merely engaging in oral agreements
and completely avoiding any applicable provisions of the Labor
Code. This lack of enforcement certainly creates a problem for
Russian society and needs to be addressed in various ways.
IV. 'GO RUSSIA'-THE FUTURE PATH OF THE RUSSIAN
LABOR LAW
And so in conclusion, I wish to reiterate a catch phrase that is
really relevant to our times, namely the slogan of today's fo-
rum: 'Go Russia!'
Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation 292
The biggest challenge that Russia had to face after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union was the reform of its economy and the
resulting "transition to free-market democracy."2 3 Eventually, it
was understood that an attempted quick transformation of Rus-
sia into a "vibrant, prosperous free-market democracy integrated
into the Western world" was not going to happen overnight and
292. President Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Federation, Speech at the World Eco-
nomic Forum (Jan. 27, 2007).
293. THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., RussIA's DECLINE AND UNCERTAIN RECOVERY 1 (2002).
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there would be a few bumps on the road.294 As such, an impor-
tant question at the beginning of the new millennium was
"whether Russia can reverse the trend of its first post-Soviet dec-
ade and rebuild an effective state or whether it will move further
along the path to collapse, with all the far-reaching conse-
quences that would entail, both in human suffering and in geo-
graphical dynamics. 295 Although the answer may have been dif-
ferent a few years ago, it is now certainly clear that Russia has
successfully reversed the initial trend and is far from collapsing.
With all the challenges and drawbacks, it is agreed that the "new
Russia is working."29 6 It is critical to remember that the Ameri-
can economy did not develop or become established over-
night29 7 and, considering its starting point during the Soviet
time, Russia has really come a long way in transforming its econ-
omy, structure, and political regimes.298
Although at a first glance, the developments in the Russian
legal culture, especially in the area of labor and employment
law, appear to be less than substantial, they are still indicative of
the beginning of this transformation process that will eventually
lead to serious change. Like many other steps in the transforma-
tion process, the effect of the current version of the Russian La-
bor Code on its legal culture is two-fold. On the one hand, as
discussed in this Article, it contains a number of old legal provi-
sions that are not compatible with the new free market and
economy because its initial draft was produced during the old
Soviet times and some of its provisions are not fitting in the new
structure of Russian society. On the other hand, a number of
important provisions have been altered and added to reflect
these changes, which also demonstrates the legislators' apprecia-
tion for the need to adjust and develop the law to match the
changes and developments in the society.
Of critical importance here, however, is the lack of enforce-
294. Id. at 2.
295. Id.
296. Bean, supra note 116, at 996.
297. Id. "It should be further noted that despite experienced, sophisticated, well
funded enforcement personnel, scandals and abuse emerge regularly in the U.S. econ-
omy." Id.
298. "Experience over the past ten years has confirmed that there is no simple,
straightforward way to convert a command economy that is dominated by military-ori-
ented production into a consumer-oriented market economy." Bean, supra note 116, at
996.
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ment of the law based on the cultural lack of faith in the law and
available legal system. A philosophical question of why people
choose to follow the law does not have a simple answer. One way
to look at this dilemma is not to assume that human behavior
responds primarily to punishment and reward, but rather to rec-
ognize that human behavior is likely affected by the "legitimacy
of legal authorities and the morality of the law."'299 For example,
one scholar argues that focusing merely on "manipulating penal-
ties and incentives" is improper.0 0 In fact, the focus should be
the creation of a "normative climate that promotes the accept-
ance of law and public policies."' 1
An argument can be made that the cultural lack of faith in
the law is currently undergoing a transformation in Russia al-
though this transition will still take time to develop. The soci-
ety's appreciation of the rule of law will continue to develop
along with all its economic changes and it will eventually become
a part of the Russian society, although it may still differ from
what is most familiar to a Westerner. In reality, such changes
often begin with the government's endorsement of the idea and
this appears to now be happening in the Russian Federation.
On January 22, 2008, then-Russian presidential candidate
(currently President), Dmitry Medvedev, spoke to non-govern-
mental workers at Moscow Civil Forum.30 2 In his speech,
Medvedev criticized widespread illegality in Russia, mostly using
illegal production of CDs and DVDs as example.30 3 He specifi-
cally opposed "legal nihilism" and stated that, "No European
country can boast of such disregard for the law."130 4 It does not
matter whether the speech concerned copyright or labor law en-
forcement; what is critical is that it demonstrates that the Rus-
299. THO AS R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 168 (2002).
300. Id.
301. Id. Tyler argues that:
People obey the law because they believe that it is proper to do so, they react
to their experiences by evaluating their justice or injustice, and in evaluating
of their experiences they consider factors unrelated to outcome, such as
whether they have had a chance to state their case and have been treated with
dignity and respect.
Id. at 178.
302. Philip Merrill, Art Watch: Medvedev on Antipiracy, THE LATIN RECORDING ACAn-
EMY, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.grammy.com/Latin/News/Default.aspx?newsID=2746&
newsCategorylD=5.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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sian government has admitted the existence of this historically
established lack of respect for the law and it is taking a stand
against nihilism, which will eventually cover all areas of law, in-
cluding labor. When it does, the new legislation may have to
produce a brand new version of the Labor Code that will make it
very easy to enforce one's rights and will encourage employees
to do so. It may be best to then create a brand new document
and give it a different name in order to open a new page in the
history of labor law and avoid the criticism that the initial version
of the Labor Code created during the Soviet era. It is hard to
predict the exact time frame for this change. However, consid-
ering how many changes Russia went through in just the last fif-
teen to twenty years, this may happen a lot sooner than one
thinks. In the end, it will require the efforts of many to get to
this new step. "Progress in the new Russia to date has re-
quired-and further progress toward a prosperous market econ-
omy in the new Russia will continue to require-the incessant
efforts of many millions of democratically inclined consumers,
voters, business leaders, legislators, lawyers, and government offi-
cials." 05
Other countries will also have a chance to take part in and
maybe even influence the transition of the Russian cultural per-
ception of the rule of law as they will continue doing business
with, providing expertise to, and remain connected to Russia. It
will be exciting to observe such fascinating changes. "Russia is
central to our world-and the newworld that is being born." '°
305. Bean, supra note 116, at 996.
306. Richard Stengal, Choosing Order Before Freedom, TIME, Dec. 18, 2007, http://
www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_16907
571696150,00.html (web only).
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